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Grimm: Grimm: Loss of a Chance

LOSS OF A CHANCE: WHO CAN
RECOVER IN MISSOURI?
Mays v. United States'
While some states act to reduce the number of medical malpractice
claims, 2 others3 are taking measures that will make it easier to recover when
a doctor's failure to diagnose or misdiagnosis has decreased the patient's
chance for survival or complete recovery. One of these measures allows
recovery for the doctor's negligence even if the plaintiff probably would have
died absent any negligence. This remedy commonly is known as "loss of a
chance."
Consider the scenario in Mays v. United States.4 Rebel Ann Mays sought
treatment at Fitzsimons Army Medical Center5 for voice loss, bronchitis, and
1. 608 F. Supp. 1476 (D. Colo. 1985).
2. Seventeen states, including Missouri, have imposed statutory caps on medical malpractice liability. California: CAL. Civ. CODE § 3333.2 (West Supp. 1987);
Indiana: IND. CODE ANN. § 16-9.5-2-2 (Burns 1983); Kansas: KAN. STAT. ANN. § 603407 (Supp. 1986); Louisiana: LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.42 (West 1986 & Supp.
1987); Missouri: Mo. REv. STAT. § 538.210 (1986); Nebraska: NEB. REV. STAT. § 442836 (1984); New Hampshire: N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 507-C:7 (1983); New Mexico:
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-5-6 (1978); North Dakota: N.D. CENT. CODE § 26-14-11 (Supp.
1985); Ohio: Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2307.43 (Anderson 1981); Oregon: OR. REv.
STAT. § 752.040(2) (1985); Pennsylvania: PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, 1301.701 (Purdon
Supp. 1986); South Dakota: S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 21-3-11 (1986); Texas: TEx.
INS. CODE ANN. art. 4950 (Vernon Supp. 1987); Virginia: VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01581.15 (1984); West Virginia: W. VA. CODE 55-7B-8 (Supp. 1986); Wisconsin: Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 655.23 (West 1980 & Supp. 1986).
3. The following courts have allowed recovery even when the plaintiff could
not show a more-likely-than-not chance of survival absent negligence. Arizona:
Thompson v. Sun City Community Hosp., 141 Ariz. 597, 688 P.2d 605 (1984);
Arkansas: Jeanes v. Milner, 428 F.2d 598 (8th Cir. 1970) (construing Arkansas state
law); Colorado: Mays v. United States, 608 F. Supp. 1476 (D. Colo. 1985) (construing
Colorado state law); Iowa: O'Brien v. Stover, 443 F.2d 1013 (8th Cir. 1971) (construing Colorado state law); Kansas: Roberson v. Counselman, 235 Kan. 1006, 686
P.2d 149 (1984); New Jersey: Evers v. Dollinger, 95 N.J. 399, 471 A.2d 405 (1984);
New York: Kallenberg v. Beth Israel Hosp., 45 A.D.2d 177, 357 N.Y.S.2d 508 (1974),
aff'd, 37 N.Y.2d 719, 337 N.E.2d 128, 374 N.Y.S.2d 615 (1975); Pennsylvania: Hamil
v. Bashline, 481 Pa. 256, 392 A.2d 1280 (1978); Washington: Herskovits v. Group
Health Coop., 99 Wash. 2d 609, 664 P.2d 474 (1983); West Virginia: Thornton v.
CAMC, 305 S.E.2d 316 (W. Va. 1983).
4. 608 F. Supp. 1476.
5. Id. at 1477-78. Because Mrs. Mays' husband, Everett, was retired from
the Air Force, she was eligible for low-cost medical care pursuant to the Civilian
Health and Medical Program of the Uniform Services, 10 U.S.C. § 1079 (1978). This
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1987

1

224

Missouri Law Review,
52, Iss. 1 [1987], Art. 15
MISSOURI
LA WVol.
REVIEW

[Vol. 52

cough. 6 X-rays taken on January 6, 1977, revealed a four-centimeter lesion
on Mrs. Mays' left lung. In his report, the radiologist noted that a followup exam should be performed in seven to ten days to determine whether the
growth was malignant. 7 Mrs. Mays was not informed of the X-ray results or
the need for further diagnostic tests or treatment .
She returned to Fitzsimons on March 4, 1977, complaining of persistent
pain in the neck and shoulder areas. More X-rays were taken, but she received
no other treatment at that time. Her health deteriorated over the next year,
and a third set of X-rays were taken on May 23, 1978. Those X-rays revealed
the lesion in the lower lobe of her left lung had grown to five and one-half
centimeters. As a result of these X-rays, Mrs. Mays was admitted to Fitzsimons for evaluation. 9
Mrs. Mays had surgery to remove the lower lobe of her left lung on
June 22, 1978. Pathology studies revealed that the growth was indeed cancerous. She underwent radiation treatment and her condition improved until
December 1978, when she became partially paralyzed and was again hospitalized. Although she was treated at several hospitals from 1979 to 1982, her
condition grew progressively worse. Mrs. Mays died on January 27, 1982.10
Mr. and Mrs. Mays sued for negligence. 1 The plaintiffs' medical expert
testified that had surgery been performed upon initial discovery of the lesion
in January 1977, Mrs. Mays would have had a forty percent chance of
until May 1978, her chance of
survival. Because no surgery was performed
12
survival decreased to fifteen percent.
If one believes the expert's testimony, Mrs. Mays' chance of survival
was reduced by twenty-five percent because of the doctor's negligence. The
federal court, applying Colorado law, awarded the plaintiffs $504,300 based
on that lost chance of survival. 3
statute requires patients to use public health care facilities when they are available.
Id. § 1079(0.
6. 608 F. Supp. at 1478.
7. Id. (Specifically, the radiologist wanted to exclude the possibility of "carcinoma or organizing infarct.").
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 1478-79.
11. Id. at 1477. Suit was brought against the United States under the Federal
Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1982). When Mrs. Mays died, the complaint
was amended to include a claim for wrongful death pursuant to COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 13-21-201 (1973), and for damages under the survival statute, Id. § 13-20-101 (Supp.
1985). Mays, 608 F. Supp. at 1477.
12. 608 F. Supp. at 1481 (The expert based his opinion that Mrs. Mays' chance
of survival had decreased 250o on his belief that the cancer had progressed from
"Stage I" to "Stage II" as a result of the delayed diagnosis). For a discussion of
staging systems, see infra notes 101-11 and accompanying text.
13. 608 F. Supp. at 1482-83. Total past losses, including medical expenses,
lost wages and home care, totaled $425,000. Mrs. Mays' future earnings of $173,200
were reduced by 75% to account for her 25% lost chance. Mr. Mays received $36,000
for loss of consortium. Id.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol52/iss1/15
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Should recovery be allowed for this "lost chance"? This Note will briefly
review the different theories of causation in medical malpractice cases, 4 and
explain how the "loss of chance" theory developed. It also will discuss the
validity of probabilities used to prove what chance was lost through negligence, and whether Missouri is likely to adopt the loss of chance doctrine. 5
To understand why some courts have allowed recovery for loss of a
chance, it helps to examine the classic theories of proving causation. Traditionally, one of two tests has6 been applied to establish cause-in-fact: "but
'1
for" or "substantial factor.
Under the "but for" or "sine qua non" rule, a plaintiff must show an
event would not have occurred "but for" the defendant's negligent act.
Stated otherwise, if the event would not have7 occurred "but for" the defendant's conduct, liability should be imposed.
There is generally one instance where the "but for" test falls. Where
two or more causes combine to produce harm, and either cause alone would
have produced the harm, some other test is needed. Under this test, the
defendant's conduct is considered a cause of the injury if it was a material
element, or "substantial factor," in bringing about the injury.'"

14. These cases assume the defendant was negligent in order to address the
primary issue of causation. See supra note 3 and cases cited therein.
15. Causation usually includes both cause-in-fact and proximate cause. Causein-fact refers to the cause-and-effect relationship between tortious conduct and loss
that must be present before liability for that loss will be imposed. Proximate cause
provides a method to limit an actor's responsibility for his tortious conduct. W.
KEETON, D.

DOBBS,

R.

KEETON

& D. OWEN,

PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS

§ 41 (5th

ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON]. This Note is concerned primarily with
cause-in-fact.
16. Id. § 41, at 266-67.
17. Id. § 41, at 266.
18. Id. at 267. The Restatement has abandoned the "but for" test in favor
of "substantial factor" for use in all cases. It states: "The actor's negligent conduct
is a legal cause of harm to another if (a) his conduct is a substantial factor in bringing
about the harm. .. ." RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 431(a) (1965).
Courts rarely define what is "substantial." The Restatement states:

The word "substantial" is used to denote the fact that the defendant's
conduct has such an effect in producing the harm as to lead reasonable men
to regard it as a cause, using that word in the popular sense, in which there

always lurks the idea of responsibility, rather than in the so-called "philosophic sense," which includes every one of the great number of events
without which any happening would not have occurred. Each of these events
is a cause in the so-called "philosophic sense," yet the effect of many of
them is so insignificant that no ordinary mind would think of them as causes.
Id. § 431 comment a.
The Restatement lists several considerations for the court in determining what
is a substantial factor: "In determining whether negligent conduct is a substantial
factor in producing harm, the trier of fact should consider (a) the number of other
factors contributing to the harm; (b) whether the actor's conduct has created a force
active in operation until the harm occurred; and (c) lapse of time." Id. § 433. Prosser
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1987
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Regardless of the test used, the plaintiff need not prove cause-in-fact to
a certainty.' 9 The evidence will be sufficient if the jury can reasonably conclude the defendant's negligence caused the harm. 20 In medical malpractice
cases, courts typically require a showing that "but for" the doctor's negligence, the patient more likely than not would have recovered.2 ' The leading
case advocating the more-likely-than-not standard in medical malpractice
actions is Cooper v. Sisters of Charity of Cincinatti, Inc.' In Cooper, a
physician negligently failed to diagnose a basal skull fracture.2Y The plaintiff's
expert testified that while there is practically a 100 percent mortality rate
without surgery for patients with injuries similar to the decedent's, "there
certainly is a chance andI can't say exactly what-maybe some place around
50%-that he would survive with surgery.' '2A
The Cooper court held that "loss of a chance of recovery, standing
alone, is not an injury from which damages will flow."'' It acknowledged
that the substantial factor test imposed a "weightier burden" than the loss
of chance theory, but decided against the lesser standard of proof. The court
held that "[tiraditional causation standards require ... evidence that a result
26
was more likely than not caused" by the negligent act.

states: "It has been considered that 'substantial factor' is a phrase sufficiently intelligible to furnish an adequate guide in instructions to the jury, and that it is neither
possible nor desirable to reduce it to any lower terms." PRossEn & KEETON, supra
note 15, at 267.
19. PRossmE & KEETON, supra note 15, § 41, at 269.
20. Id. A mere possibility of causation will not suffice; the court will direct
a verdict for the defendant when the matter remains one of speculation or conjecture,
or the probabilities are at best evenly balanced. See Kimmie v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n,
334 Mo. 596, 604, 66 S.W.2d 561, 565 (1933); see also Bertram v. Wunning, 385
S.W.2d 803, 807 (Mo. Ct. App. 1965).
21. See, e.g., Gooding v. University Hosp. Bldg., 445 So. 2d 1015 (Fla. 1984).
22. 27 Ohio St. 2d 242, 272 N.E.2d 97 (1971). The Cooper court followed
principles stated in Kuhn v. Banker, 133 Ohio St. 304, 13 N.E.2d 242 (1938). Kuhn
stated that causation must be shown to a "reasonable certainty" or "reasonable
probability," and medical testimony must establish that the negligence "more likely
than not" caused the subsequent condition. Kuhn, 133 Ohio St. at -, 13 N.E.2d
at 246.
23. Cooper, 27 Ohio St. 2d at -, 272 N.E.2d at 101. The physician was one
of several co-defendants, which included the hospital and an association that oversaw
emergency room operations. Id. at -, 272 N.E.2d at 100-01.
24. Id. at
272 N.E.2d at 100-01 (emphasis in original).
25. Id. at
, 272 N.E.2d at 102 (quoting Kuhn v. Banker, 133 Ohio St. 304,
315, 13 N.E.2d 242, 247 (1938)).
26. Id. at -, 272 N.E.2d at 103. The court decided no exception should be
made in medical malpractice cases, despite the emotional attractions of such an
exception. It said:
Lesser standards of proof are understandably attractive in malpractice cases
where physical well-being, and life itself, are the subject of litigation. The
-,
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4

Grimm: Grimm: Loss of a Chance

LOSS OF A CHANCE

1987]

The Cooper court required evidence of a probability of survival to prevent juror speculation. "The use of the words, 'maybe' and 'around' does
not connote that there is probability; those words, in the context used, could
mean either more than 50%, or less than 50%."27 Therefore, the Cooper
court affirmed the lower court's decision for the defendant.,The reasoning from Cooper continues to be applied in more recent cases

such as Gooding v. University Hospital Building.29 In Gooding, a wrongful
death action, the plaintiff alleged the hospital's emergency room employees
were negligent in failing to diagnose and treat the decedent's abdominal aortic
aneurysm.30 Although the hospital had breached its duty of care, the evidence
established a no better than even chance of survival even had there been an
immediate diagnosis of the aneurysm and emergency surgery. 3 The court
retained the more likely than not standard of causation in medical malpractice
cases, affirming the court of appeals' decision in favor of the hospital.3 2
strong intuitive sense of humanity tends to emotionally direct us toward a
conclusion that in an action for wrongful death an injured person should
be compensated for the loss of any chance for survival, regardless of its
remoteness. However, we have trepidations that such a rule would be so
loose that it would produce more injustice than justice. Even though there
exists authority for a rule allowing recovery based upon proof of causation
by evidence not meeting the standard of probability, we are not persuaded
by their logic.
Id. at

-,

272 N.E.2d at 103.

27. Id. at -, 272 N.E.2d at 104. This is not to suggest, however, that expert
testimony in terms less probative than more-likely-than-not will not be admitted.
When courts do admit such testimony, it does not necessarily mean the court is
adopting a more lenient standard of proof. See, e.g., King, Causation, Valuation,
and Chance in PersonalInjury Torts Involving Preexisting Conditions and Future
Consequences, 90 YALE L.J. 1353, 1366 n.42 (1981).
28. Cooper, 27 Ohio St. at -, 272 N.E.2d at 105.
29. 445 So. 2d 1015 (Fla. 1984).
30. Id. at 1017.
31. Id. at 1018.
32. Id. at 1021. Relaxing the standard, the court said, might correct perceived
unfairness, but could also create an injustice. "Health care providers could find
themselves defending cases simply because a patient fails to improve or where serious
disease processes are not arrested because another could possibly bring a better result." Id. at 1019-20.
The court also questioned the propriety of lowering the standard of causation
in malpractice suits against doctors but not as to other professionals. Id. at 1020.
The Washington Supreme Court addressed this issue in Daugert v. Pappas, 104 Wash.
2d 254, 704 P.2d 600 (1985) (en banc). The case involved a legal malpractice claim
against an attorney for failure to file a timely appeal. Proving causation in a legal
malpractice claim requires the plaintiff to show that the appellate court would have
granted appeal and rendered a judgment more favorable to the client. Id. at 258, 704
P.2d at 603. The Washington supreme court followed the rule that these were decisions
for the judge, not the jury. Id. at -, 704 P.2d at 604. But the trial judge in Daugert,
applying loss of a chance theory, gave the issue of causation to the jury. The Wash-
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Under traditional causation rules, a plaintiff who proves a fifty percent
or less chance of survival absent negligence receives nothing as a matter of
law. 33 If, however, he can show a fifty-one percent chance of survival, he
may submit his case to the jury. If the jury rules in his favor, he may retain
the judgment and it will not be discounted 4by the chance that the loss would
have occurred even absent the negligence.
Several courts and commentators have criticized this "all-or-nothing"
approach. 5 Slight variations in an expert's testimony, they say, may produce
very different outcomes at trial.16 The all-or-nothing approach is inconsistent
with a loss of chance theory.3 7 Thus, loss of chance is seen as a solution to
this perceived unfairness.
The first application of loss of a chance to a medical malpractice case
came in Hicks v. United States.38 In Hicks, plaintiff's decedent sought medington Supreme Court reversed; it said the substantive case ultimately would be
reviewed by the Supreme Court, so loss of a chance need not be applied. Id. at -,
704 P.2d at 606. Unfortunately, misdiagnosis often deprives a patient of a chance
for survival, for which there is no other remedy. For a Washington case applying
loss-of-a-chance to medical malpractice actions, see infra notes 65-71 and accompanying text.
33. See generally King, supra note 27; Wolfstone & Wolfstone, Recovery of
Damages for the Loss of a Chance, 1982 MtD. TRiAL TECH. Q. 121.
34. King, supra note 27, at 1366; Wolfstone & Wolfstone, supra note 33, at
122.
35. King, supra note 27, at 1366-67; Wolfstone & Wolfstone, supra note 33,
at 122-23; see also Herskovits v. Group Health Coop., 99 Wash. 2d 609, 624, 664
P.2d 474, 486 (1983) (Pearson, J., concurring).
36. If, for example, a victim had more than a 50% chance originally, a jury
will be permitted to find that the negligence probably was the "but for" cause of
the ultimate injury (death) and award full damages. If another victim had a 50%
chance or less, the majority of courts would not allow the jury even to consider the
evidence. See, e.g., Cooper, 27 Ohio St. 2d at 253, 272 N.E.2d at 104. But see infra
notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
Some courts have misinterpreted these cases as requiring the plaintiff to show
his chance of recovery was decreased by at least 51% before he can get his case to
the jury. See Thompson v. Sun City Community Hosp., 141 Ariz. 597, - n.9, 688
P.2d 605, 614 n.9 (1984); see also Grippe v. Momtazee, No. 475121, slip op. at 6
(Mo. Ct. App. Oct. 10, 1984), vacated, 696 S.W.2d 797 (Mo. 1985) (en banc), on
retransfer, 705 S.W.2d 551 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986). In fact, the size of chance lost is
irrelevant. The percentage chance prior to the alleged negligence traditionally has been
the important factor in determining causation.
37. See, e.g., Herskovits, 99 Wash. 2d at 634, 664 P.2d at 477; see also King,
supra note 27, at 1371-72. Some courts have limited damages to represent the percentage of chance lost. See, e.g., Herskovits, 99 Wash. 2d at 632-34, 664 P.2d at
486 (Pearson, J., concurring); see also notes 92-93 and accompanying text. But see
Kallenberg v. Beth Israel Hosp., 45 A.D.2d 177, 357 N.Y.S.2d 508 (1974), aff'd, 37
N.Y.2d 719, 337 N.E.2d 128, 374 N.Y.S.2d 615 (1975) (discussed infra notes 96-98
and accompanying text).
38. 368 F.2d 626 (4th Cir. 1966).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol52/iss1/15
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ical treatment at a naval dispensary for intense abdominal pain and vomiting.3 9 The doctor's diagnosis was gastroenteritis; he prescribed pain medicine,
sent her home, and told her to return in eight hours. The exam lasted about
ten minutes. 40
Just before she was due to return, she drank some water, collapsed, and
died. Death was caused by a massive hemorrhagic infarction of the intestine
41
resulting from its strangulation.
Experts testified the examining doctor was negligent because he conducted only a cursory examination of the patient before making his diagnosis. 42 Both of the plaintiff's witnesses testified that the patient would have
lived had she been operated on promptly.43 This was not contradicted by the
government's witnesses. 44 Thus, Hicks would have recoved damages under
45
the traditional more likely than not test.
Courts adopting loss of chance, however, frequently cite Hicks as authority for the lost chance theory because of its extensive dictum.4 6 The
Fourth Circuit said in Hicks:
When a defendant's negligent action or inaction has effectively terminated
a person's chance of survival, it does not lie in the defendant's mouth to
raise conjectures as to the measure of the chances that he has put beyond
the possibility of realization. If there was any substantialpossibility of survival and the defendant has destroyed it, he is answerable. Rarely is it
possible to demonstrate to an absolute certainty what would have happened
in circumstances that the wrongdoer did not allow to come to pass. The law
does not in the existing circumstances require the plaintiff to show to a
39. Id. at 628.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 629.
42. Id. The symptoms of high obstruction and of gastroenteritis are quite
similar. The district court said the doctor merely made a judgment error. The court
of appeals said that when the symptoms are consistent with either of two possible
conditions, one lethal and one not, due care demands that the doctor make more
than a cursory examination. The doctor should have made a rectal exam to determine
whether the woman had an intestinal obstruction. Id. at 629-30.
43. Id. at 632.
44. Id.
45. With virtually a 100% chance of survival absent negligence, the facts in
Hicks certainly do not lend themselves to a loss of chance theory. Loss of chance
theory is used only when a plaintiff could not recover under the traditional morelikely-than-not test. Since the plaintiff could in this case, there was no need for the
court to refer to substantial possibility of survival or to reduced chances.
46. See, e.g., Herskovits v. Group Health Coop., 99 Wash. 2d 609, -, 664
P.2d 474, 478 (1983); Jeanes v. Milner, 428 F.2d 598, 605 (8th Cir. 1970); O'Brien
v. Stover, 443 F.2d 1013, 1018 (8th Cir. 1971). In subsequent cases, the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals has interpreted Jeanes and O'Brien as proximate cause and not
loss of a chance cases. See Voegeli v. Lewis, 568 F.2d 89, 94 (8th Cir. 1977); Savage
v. Christian Hosp. N.W., 543 F.2d 44, 48 (8th Cir. 1976).
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certainty that the patient would have lived had she been hospitalized and
operated on promptly.- 7
The Hicks court also made reference to another federal case, Gardner v.
NationalBulk Carriers,Inc. ,48 which imposed liability on a ship's master for
failing to attempt to rescue a seaman who had fallen overboard.4 9 The Gardner court rejected the argument that the shipmaster's negligence was not a
cause of the seaman's death.5 0 It held that once the evidence indicated a
reasonablepossibility of rescue existed, total disregard of the duty imposed
liability."
Courts favoring loss of chance frequently use "substantial possibility"
or "reasonable possibility" language to justify lowering the standard of causation.12 These courts apparently ignore the Fourth Circuit's claims that "Hicks
laid down no new rule of law with respect to either negligence or proximate
'5 3
cause."
47. Hicks v. United States, 368 F.2d 626, 632 (4th Cir. 1966) (emphasis added
to "substantial possibility").
48. 310 F.2d 284 (4th Cir. 1962).
49. Id. at 288.
50. Id. at 287 ("[C]ausation is proved if the master's omission destroys the
reasonable possibility of rescue.").
51. Id. at 288 (emphasis added).
52. See, e.g., Jeanes v. Milner, 428 F.2d 598, 605 (8th Cir. 1970); O'Brien
v. Stover, 443 F.2d 1013, 1018 (8th Cir. 1971); see also King, supranote 27, at 136869 n.53.
53. Clark v. United States, 402 F.2d 950, 953 n.4 (4th Cir. 1968) (where
plaintiff sued for negligence, alleging that doctors misdiagnosed her injury as a kidney
infection instead of a blocked ureter). The Clark court said:
We do not read [Hicks] to mean that every delay in the use of diagnostic
procedures is negligence; we read Hicks to mean only that when confronted
with symptoms of a condition requiring immediate treatment, a physician
must utilize his knowledge and skill to ascertain the presence of that condition, absent some consideration that would cause the ordinary prudent
practitioner to delay. Certainly Hicks laid down no new rule of law with
respect to either negligence or proximate cause; indeed, it could not since
the statute clearly requires us to apply the law of the place where the act
or omission occurred.
Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)). Judge Boreman agreed in his dissent:
I do not construe Hicks as altering the traditional tort concepts of causation
as applied by state and federal courts .... The facts in Hicks demonstrate
that causation in the usual sense had been shown without contradiction, i.e.,
that it was more probable than not that the negligence substantially caused
or added to the fatal injury.. . . [I]t was not intended to lay down a principal
of tort law supplanting long-established and approved state rules.
Id. at 955-56 (Boreman, J., dissenting).
Another judge has said Hicks "stands for no more than a rejection of a reasonable certainty standard of proof, and an acceptance of a reasonable probability
standard. Viewed thus, it advances [a] plaintiff's case very little." Herskovits v. Group
Health Coop., 99 Wash. 2d 609, 630, 664 P.2d 474, 485 (1983) (Pearson, J., concurring).
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Adding to the complexity of post-Hicks decisions is a line of cases that
reduce the degree of certainty required to get to the jury, but maintain the
"substantial factor" test for causation.14 These cases rely on section 323(a)
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which subjects a person to liability if
55
he increases the risk of harm to another.
The landmark medical malpractice case under section 323(a) is Hamil
v. Bashline.5 6 In that case, the plaintiff took her husband, who was having
severe chest pains, to a local hospital emergency room. The doctor assigned
to the emergency room could not be located. Another doctor ordered an
electrocardiogram, but the machine failed because of a faulty outlet. After
ordering the staff to locate a second machine, the doctor left the hospital.
When Mr. Hamil went untreated, Mrs. Hamil took her husband to a local
7
doctor's office, where he died of a myocardial infarction.
The plaintiff's expert witness testified that Mr. Hamil lost a seventy-five
percent chance for survival as a result of the hospital's negligence. 8 The
court held this did not sufficiently establish to a reasonable degree of medical
certainty that the hospital's negligence caused her husband's death. 9 It held,
however, that section 323(a) lowered the degree of certainty required in med0
ical malpractice cases, and the case went to the jury on that basis.
Using the Hamil analysis, once the plaintiff shows that a doctor or
hospital's negligence has increased the risk of harm to the plaintiff and that
harm was sustained, the plaintiff has made a prima facie case of causation.
54. See infra notes 56-80 and accompanying text.
55. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323(a) (1965). It provides:
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services
to another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of the
other's person or things, is subject to liability to the other for physical harm
resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to perform his undertaking, if ... his failure to exercise such care increases the risk of such
harm ....
Id.
56. 481 Pa. 256, 392 A.2d 1280 (1978).
57. Id. at 263, 392 A.2d at 1283. A myocardial infarction is a heart attack.
58. Id. The basis of the plaintiff's complaint was that Bashline failed to
employ recognized and available methods of treating the heart attack. The plaintiff's
medical expert outlined the typical methods of treatment: bed, oxygen, and pain
relieving drugs. He said the hospital was negligent in not employing these methods.
Id.
59. Id. at 268, 392 A.2d at 1286-87. The plaintiff asserted that the negligence
was a substantial factor in causing the death. The defendant contended that the
plaintiff's expert did not make his statements to a reasonable degree of medical
certainty. Id.
60. Id. The court favored using section 323(a) so negligent doctors would not
be "completely insulated" from liability because of minor uncertainties in causation.
It said the very nature of medical malpractice actions demand a lower certainty
requirement. Id.
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The jury then decides whether the plaintiff more likely than not would have
survived absent the negligence of the defendant. In making its determination,
the jury weighs the probabilities and must find for the plaintiff if the negligence was a substantial factor in producing the injury. 61
62
The facts in Hami1
and in subsequent Pennsylvania decisions 63 did not
require the courts to address the loss of a chance doctrine, since all of these
cases met the "but for" or "substantial factor" requirements. At least one
court, however, cited Hamil as authority for recovery under a lost chance
analysis. 64
In Herskovits v. Group Health Cooperative,65 testimony indicated the
doctor's negligent delay in diagnosing lung cancer caused the decedent's
chance of survival to decrease from thirty-nine percent to twenty-five percent . 6 The court, relying on Hamil, decided a fourteen percent reduction in
chance was sufficient to go, to the jury under section 323(a). 7 Like Hamil,
68
the Herskovits court characterized the harm suffered as the actual death.
61. Id. at 269-70, 392 A.2d at 1286-87.
62. Id. at 262-64, 392 A.2d at 1283-84. The plaintiff's expert testified that
the decedent would have had a 75% chance of survival had the hospital acted properly
and promptly to detect the heart attack. Id.
63. The chances of recovery were less clearly supported in subsequent cases;
this indicates the Pennsylvania Supreme Court might be hedging on the substantial
factor test. The Pennsylvania courts still use language indicating they require more
than a 50% chance of survival initially. See Gradel v. Inouye, 491 Pa. 534, 545, 421
A.2d 674, 679 (1980) (doctor testified negligence was a "substantial factor" in requiring plaintiff to undergo amputation); Jones v. Montefiore Hosp., 494 Pa. 410,
418-19, 431 A.2d 920, 924-25 (1981) (testimony indicated cancer "probably" would
not spread and that negligence cut plaintiff's life expectancy in half). But see Hoeke
v. Mercy Hosp., 299 Pa. Super 416, -, 445 A.2d 140, 143-46 (1982) (to get to the
jury, the plaintiff must show defendant destroyed a "substantial possibility" of survival).
64. See, e.g., Herskovits v. Group Health Coop., 99 Wash. 2d 609, 614-16,
664 P.2d 474, 477 (1983); see also Evers v. Dollinger, 95 N.J. 399, 471 A.2d 405
(1984) (court allowed the jury to consider evidence suggesting the plaintiff had a 25%
chance of experiencing a recurrence of breast cancer because of the doctor's delayed
diagnosis).
65. 99 Wash. 2d 609, 664 P.2d 474 (1983).
66. Id. at 613, 664 P.2d at 475.
67. Id. at 619, 664 P.2d at 479 (citing Hamil v. Bashline, 481 Pa. 256, 392
A.2d 1280 (1978)). But see Orcutt v. Spokane County, 58 Wash. 2d 846, 364 P.2d
1102 (1961) (holding that medical testimony must show the injury more likely than
not was caused by negligence). This decision reflects a position contrary to the reasoning in Orcutt.
68. 99 Wash. 2d at 619, 664 P.2d at 479. Four concurring judges sharply
criticized the majority for characterizing death as the compensable interest. The concurring opinion suggested it should be recharacterized as the actual loss of chance.
This would allow the jury to find for the plaintiff if the negligence more likely than
not caused the loss of chance. A recharacterization would prevent the jury from
defining "substantial factor" in terms of less than a 51% chance. Id. at 625, 664
P.2d at 487 (Pearson, J., concurring).
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In Hamil, the evidence weighed strongly in the plaintiff's favor in that the
decedent would have had a seventy-five percent chance of living but for the
negligence of the defendant. 69 In Herskovits, the decedent had only a thirtynine percent chance of survival which, according to plaintiff's evidence, was
reduced to twenty-five percent.7 0 No rational jury should have been able to
"balance the probabilities" of causing death, and still found in favor of the
71
plaintiff.
Arizona approved the application of section 323(a) to medical malpractice cases in Thompson v. Sun City Community Hospital.7 2 In Thompson,
a thirteen year old boy whose left leg was severely injured was denied emergency care at a private hospital because his mother did not have proper
insurance. 73 The hospital was found negligent for transferring the boy for
74
economic reasons rather than medical reasons in violation of a state statute.
The hospital denied causation, however, since the boy's injuries were so
serious he might have suffered residual impairment of his leg regardless of
75
negligence.
Nevertheless, the appellate court affirmed the trial court judgment for
the plaintiff. In doing so, the court, while persuaded by the dictum in Hamil
and Herskovits, went one step further by characterizing the injury as the lost
chance. 76 Rather than basing the issue of causation on death, the court decided the interest the law was protecting was the chance itself.7 The issue
69.

481 Pa. at 263, 392 A.2d at 1283; see supra note 58 and accompanying

text.
70. 99 Wash. 2d at 612, 664 P.2d at 475.
71. In justifying its result, the Herskovits court paraphrased from Hamil and
said, "The step from the increased risk to causation is one for the jury to make."
Id. at 617, 664 P.2d at 478. What Hamil said was: "[O]nce the jury is apprised of
the likelihood that defendant's conduct resulted in plaintiff's harm, . . . the jury,
and not the medical expert, [has] the task of balancing probabilities." 481 Pa. at
272, 392 A.2d at 1288 (emphasis added).
72. 141 Ariz. 597, 688 P.2d 605 (1984).
73. Id. at
688 P.2d at 608.
74. Id. at
688 P.2d at 612. Private hospitals have a statutory duty to
render emergency care to indigents under Amiz. REv. STAT. Am. § 14-1837(A) (1976).
The only legitimate basis for transfer to another hospital is if it would benefit the
patient medically. The statute permits reimbursement from public funds for emergency
care charges incurred at the private hospital. Id.
75. Thompson, 141 Ariz. at -, 688 P.2d at 613.
76. Id. at
688 P.2d at 616.
77. Id. at
688 P.2d at 616. The court emphasized that traditional causation rules will apply in most tort cases. It said, however, that "the interest which
the law is protecting [here] is the chance itself, and the chief problem is the evaluation
of the chance, which is a function peculiarly within the province of the jury." Id.
(emphasis in original) (quoting Malone, Ruminations on Cause-in-Fact, 9 STAN. L.
REv. 60 (1956)).
In reaching its decision, the court relied heavily on other loss of chance cases
-'

-,

-,
-'
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of lost chance is submitted to the jury when the plaintiff shows that negligence
increased the risk of harm.78 The jury is instructed to find for the defendant
unless they find a probabilitythat the negligence was a cause in reducing the
plaintiff's chance for recovery.7 9 In essence, a plaintiff will recover if he can
show the defendant's negligence more likely than not caused the lost chance.80
A few courts have, without referring to the Restatement provision, allowed recovery for loss of a not better than even chance. They do this by
recognizing the lost chance-not the death or the injury-as the compensable
interest. 8'
In Jeanes v. Milner,82 evidence suggested an eleven percent reduction in
chances for survival-from thirty-five to twenty-four percent-because of
delayed diagnosis.83 The court relied on Hicks for the proposition that the
84
defendant can be liable for destroying any substantial possibility of survival.
In reversing the trial court decision, the appellate court held the issue of
85
causation was one for the jury.
such as rescue of seamen and escape from fire. See Malone, supra.
The Thompson decision was the first to apply section 323(a) to medical malpractice cases and to characterize the injury as the lost chance. This is similar to the
approach urged by several judges and commentators. See, e.g., Herskovits, 99 Wash.
2d at 632-34, 664 P.2d at 486 (Pearson, J., concurring); King, supra note 27, at 137879; Comment, Medical Malpractice: The Right to Recover for the Loss of a Chance
for Survival, 12 PEPPERDnE L. REv. 973 (1985).

78. Thompson, 141 Ariz. at -, 688 P.2d at 616. The primary reason for
the lesser certainty requirement was to avoid perceived unfairness under the "more
likely than not" test. The court said that test "puts a premium on each party's search
for the willing witness .... [F]or every expert who evaluates the lost chance at 49%

there is another who estimates it at closer to 51%." Id. at -, 688 P.2d at 615.
79. Id. at
688 P.2d at 616 (emphasis added).
80. Id. at
688 P.2d at 616. The court did not phrase the test as "more
likely than not," but this is implied from the language. By adopting section 323(a)
in medical malpractice cases, the court rejected the holding of an often-quoted Arizona case, Hiser v. Randolph, 126 Ariz. 608, 617 P.2d 774 (Ct. App. 1980). Hiser
held that proof of a loss of a chance of recovery established only the possibility of
causation, and there would be no recovery absent proof that the malpractice was the
probable cause of death. Id. at 612, 617 P.2d at 778.
81. Commentators prefer to see loss of chance cases handled this way. Compare infra note 92 with Thompson, 141 Ariz. at -, 688 P.2d at 616 (where the
court recognized lost chance (impliedly) but used the RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS
§ 323(a) to lower the certainty requirement).
82. 428 F.2d 598 (8th Cir. 1970).
83. Id. at 604. One expert testified that lymphosarcoma discovered in Stage
I, when it is still localized, offers a 35% rate of survival; in Stage II, the rate decreases
to 24%. When this doctor examined the patient, the cancer was in Stage II. If it was
present at all when the defendant-doctor examined the patient, it would have been
in Stage I. Id.
84. Id. at 605 (citing Hicks v. United States, 368 F.2d 626, 632 (4th Cir.
-'

-,

1966)).
85. Id. This case has been interpreted as characterizing the compensable in-
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In James v. United States,8 6 the plaintiff claimed that his five year chance
of survival was decreased by ten percent to fifteen percent because an examining physician failed to discover a cancerous tumor.Y All witnesses agreed,
however, that the tumor would have been inoperable at the time it should
have been discovered; thus, the court did not allow recovery on a lost chance
theory.88 Rather, the court said that if the tumor had been discovered, perhaps
the plaintiff's life would have been lengthened or he would have suffered
less pain by other appropriate treatment. 89 The court allowed the plaintiff to
recover damages on that basis. 9°
Courts generally have computed damages in loss of chance cases' in one
of three ways. 91 One method would allow the plaintif to recover only for his
lost chance. 92 Assume, for example, the patient had a forty percent chance
of survival absent negligence, which was reduced to ten percent because of
a physician's misdiagnosis of heart disease. Under this theory, the victim
would receive thirty percent of the compensable value of his life had he
survived (including what his earning capacity would otherwise have been in
the years following death). The value placed on the patient's life would reflect
such factors as his age, health, -and earning potential, including the fact that
terest as the lost chance. See Herskovits v. Group Health Coop., 99 Wash. 2d 609,
632-34, 664 P.2d 474, 486 (1983) (Pearson, J., concurring). Thus, the jury would
have to decide, based on probabilities, whether the defendant caused the lost chance.
Jeanes was closely paralleled by O'Brien v. Stover, 443 F.2d 1013 (8th Cir.
1971). The O'Brien court suggested that loss of a chance of survival should be
considered in the damage award. It did not expressly acknowledge that the chance
was not better than even (although the expert testimony did not suggest otherwise).
Id. at -. Although O'Brien applied Iowa law, a later Iowa case apparently retained
an all-or-nothing view of loss of a chance. See Speed v. State, 240 N.W.2d 901, 906
(Iowa 1976).
86. 483 F. Supp. 581 (N.D. Cal. 1980).
87. Id. at 585. The language indicates the chance of survival was less than
50%. The plaintiff's experts never testified as to the plaintiff's chances of survival
absent any negligence.
88. Id. at 585-86. The plaintiff's expert testified the tumor probably was in
the mediastinum, which would make it inoperable. The defendant's expert agreed it
was in the mediastinum or in the upper right bronchus next to the trachea, also
rendering it inoperable. Id.
89. Id. at 587.
90. Id. at 587-88.
91. This Note will give only a brief synopsis of the three methods. For a more
extensive discussion, see King, supra note 27, at 1381; Wolfstone & Wolfstone, supra
note 33, at 129.
92. This is the method generally favored by commentators. See, e.g., King,
supra note 27, at 1382; Comment, supra note 77, at 973; see also Herskovits v. Group
Health Coop., 99 Wash. 2d 609, 632-34, 664 P.2d 474, 486 (1983) (Pearson, J.,
concurring). This is the method used by the court in Mays, 608 F. Supp. 1476
(discussed supra note 13 and accompanying text). Actual damages are not affected
by loss of chance and still are fully recoverable under this method.
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he had suffered the heart attack and the assumption that he had survived it.
The forty percent computation would be applied to that base figure. 93
A second method would allow damages to the extent that the defendant's
negligence caused the death of the patient sooner than the ailment would
have with timely diagnosis and treatment. The recovery would be augmented
by compensation for any aggravation of the patient's condition, such as
additional pain and medical expense. 94 This seems to be the position taken
by the majority in Herskovits.9
The third alternative would allow the plaintiff to recover all damages
incurred as if the defendant had completely caused the injury. 96 Only Kallemberg v. Beth Israel Hospita 7 has adopted this approach.98
For many years judges were hesitant to allow statistics and probabilities
into the courtroom. They feared jurors would place too much emphasis on
what might appear as a mathematical certainty. Gradually, the standards
relaxed; but evidence of less than a fifty-fifty chance seldom was admitted. 99
Dean McCormick long advocated the use of such evidence even when
the statistical probability was less than fifty percent, provided the probabilities in question are fairly measureable and calculable.'0 ° This leads to the
question: Do medical probabilities-particularly those dealing with cancermeet Dean McCormick's test?
The most common method of estimating a cancer patient's chance of
survival is through a "staging system."'10 Essentially, physicians use staging
to describe the extent of the disease and grading to determine the severity
93.

Herskovits, 99 Wash. 2d at 635, 664 P.2d at 487 (quoting King, supra

note 27, at 1382).
94.

See, e.g., Chester v. United States, 403 F. Supp. 458, 460-61 (W.D. Pa.

1975) (court awarded $36,741.10 for loss of earning power, $7,500 for loss of guidance

for his minor children and $1,747 for funeral expenses), aff'd, 546 F.2d 415 (3d Cir.
1976); see also Wooldridge v. Woolett, 96 Wash. 2d 659, 638 P.2d 566 (1981).
95. Herskovits, 99 Wash. 2d at 619, 664 P.2d at 479.
96. The plaintiff presumably would recover just as he would under the all-

or-nothing approach.
97. 45 A.D.2d 177, 357 N.Y.S.2d 508 (1974), aff'd, 37 N.Y.2d 719, 337
N.E.2d 128, 374 N.Y.S.2d 615 (1975).
98. Id. at 179-80, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 511 (court allowed recovery of $55,000 for

wrongful death and $15,000 for pain and suffering where the decedent was deprived
of a 20% to 40% chance of survival).
99. C. McCoMUnCK, MCCoRMICK ON DAmAGES § 26 (1935).
100. Id.
101. There are several types of staging systems. The most widely used are the
Columbia, Manchester, American T-N-M, and the International T-N-M. See V.
DErVITA, JR., S. HELLmAN & S. ROSENBERG, CANCER: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF
ONCOLOGY (1st ed. 1982) [hereinafter V. DEvITA]; see also DoNEGAN & SPRATr, CANCER oF THE BREAST 224 (2d ed. 1979); Henderson & Canellos, Cancer of the Breast,
302 NEw ENo. J. MED. 17 (1980).
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of the tumor. 10 2 These allow the physician to categorize a particular case with
other cases having a similar prognosis.0 3
Staging systems incorporate clinical characteristics that have been systematically recorded for previous cancer patients; those characteristics vary
depending on the type of cancer involved, but usually include tumor size,
the extent of local and regional invasion, and evidence of distant metastases.10 By matching characteristics of present patients with those of past
patients, physicians can estimate the chances of survival. 05
For example, assume Patient A had a three-centimeter breast tumor with
palpable freely movable axillary nodes before undergoing a mastectomy. To
determine her five-year chance of survival, a physician might use these and
other characteristics to categorize her into one of four stages of advancement:
I, II, III, or IV. The more advanced the stage of the disease, the less chance
there is for survival.°6
A plaintiff's expert would likely use the staging system to show that
delayed diagnosis decreases the chance of survival. If one assumes, for example, that breast cancer spreads in an orderly manner from the breast to
regional lymph nodes and only then to distant organs, it is logical to assume
that a patient's chance of survival will be significantly better if a mastectomy
is performed while the cancer is localized in the breast. ° 7
102. Staging is based on the physical exam, surgical findings, and biopsies,
and determines the extent of the disease. Cancers usually are classified into one of
three stages: Stage I means the cancer still is local in nature; in Stage II, it already
has spread regionally; in Stage III, distant metastasis has occurred.
Grading is the pathologist's opinion of how primative (anaplastic) the tumor
cells are. A typical grading scheme is:
Grade I: the cancerous tissue resembles host tissue (only slightly more primative
than normal tissue, but is invasive of normal tissue). Grade II: intermediate pleomorphism of cells. The tissue is becoming a mixture of primative and more mature
cells. This is the most common. Grade III: anaplastic. Primative, highly invasive of
vessels and tissue even in a small tumor. Usually means short survival even if tumor
is small or found early.
103. See Michels & Mirra, Attacking the Doubling Time Defense in Breast
CancerCases, 1981 MED. TRiAL TECH. Q. 301, 306.
104. V. DnvrrA, supra note 101, at 255-57; Henderson & Canellos, supra note
101, at 17. Dozens of factors relate to the survival of cancer patients. Among these
the most significant are tumor growth rate, local skin involvement, tumor fixation
to the chest wall, and inflammation.
105. V. DnvrrA, supra note 101, at 255-57; Henderson & Canellos, supra note
101, at 17.
106. See Parver, Defense of Delayed Diagnosisand Treatment of Breast Cancer, 1984 MED. TsuAL TE cH. Q. 34, 39. Regardless of the staging system used, patients
with Stage I (or A) disease have the best prognosis; those with Stage II and III (B
and C) have intermediate probabilities of five-year and ten-year survival; and those
with Stage IV (or D) have metastatic disease and the worst prognosis. Henderson &
Canellos, supra note 101, at 17.
107. Henderson & Canellos, supra note 101, at 17. This assumption is now

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1987

15

Missouri Law Review,
52, Iss. 1 [1987], Art. 15
MISSOURI
LA WVol.REVIEW

[Vol. 52

While most physicians use a staging system to facilitate treatment of
cancer patients, some of them believe delayed diagnosis does not adversely
affect a patient's ultimate chance of survival. These beliefs are founded on
a "doubling time" theory of cancer.10 The "doubling time" theory emphasizes the growth rate of cancer cells. Studies show that one cancer cell initially
divides into two, and these into four, etc. The "doubling time" represents
the number of days it takes for cells to divide. The doubling time varies from
one person to another; it also varies among different types of cancer and
sometimes between primary tumors and distant metastases °9
Based on this theory, some doctors believe most patients have wellestablished metastases by the time of the first diagnosis. It also could explain
the appearance of metastases many years after a mastectomy; if a person
had an extremely slow doubling rate, metastasis probably would begin before
the primary tumor became detectable, but might not appear until years later." 0
Since survival rates decrease markedly as the stages advance, a plaintiff's
doctor could use the staging system to show that a delayed diagnosis significantly decreased the patient's chances of survival. To counter this evidence,
a defense witness might use the doubling time theory to show that the delayed
diagnosis really had no effect on the patient's overall chance of survival.
Which theory is more accurate remains highly controversial."'
One problem with the loss of chance theory is that it necessarily places
great weight on the use of statistics to show the effect of a physician's
negligence on a patient's chance of survival. Numbers that were collected to
guide therapy are being used to indicate fault. This can lead to false assumptions on the part of the jury.
being questioned by some physicians. See generally Fisher, Redmond & Fisher, The
Contribution of Recent NSABP Clinical Trials of Primary Breast Therapy to an
Understanding of Tumor Biology - An Overview of Findings, 46 CANCER 1009
(1980). The defense would counter this argument with evidence regarding the grade
of tumor, menopausal status and other risk factors, especially family history.
108. See Parver, supra note 106, at 35; Michels & Mirra, supra note 103, at
302-03.
109. The doubling time depends directly on the fraction of cells actually capable
of dividing. This gives the physician a "growth fraction," measured by the number
capable of dividing relative to the total number of tumor cells. The growth fraction
decreases and tumor growth tends to slow as a tumor becomes larger because cells
compete with other cells for nutrients. Physicians use various methods to estimate
doubling times, including repeated mammography, measurement of recurrences, and
labeling of biopsy specimens from tumors. Parver, supra note 106, at 40-41.
110. Id. at 46. Assume, for example, that a primary tumor had an average
doubling time of 100 days. It would take about eight years to reach one centimeter
in size, which is generally the smallest that can be detected. If the metastasis also
had a 100-day doubling time, it could begin growing four or five years after the
primary tumor. Therefore, under this theory, metastasis may have occurred even
before the primary tumor became detectable. Id. at 40-41.
Ill. Id. at 35; see also Michels & Mirra, supra note 103, at 310-11.
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For example, a patient's chance of survival always will decrease as the
cancer progresses from Stage I to Stage II to Stage III; that much is common
sense. This would seem to indicate that cancer first develops as a local lesion2
capable of cure by operation before it spreads to other parts of the body."
Some scientists, however, now question the validity of this theory. They offer
an alternative hypothesis of cancer as a systemic disease almost from its
inception.1 3 Physicians subscribing to this hypothesis believe cancer begins
spreading regionally even before the primary tumor becomes detectable, and
that variations in local-regional therapy are unlikely to substantially affect
14
survival rates.
Another argument used by defense experts is that the increase in the
length of survival for those patients diagnosed in an earlier stage of disease
may reflect only the fact that the time of diagnosis was advanced-not that
death was delayed. In other words, survival from the date of diagnosis will
appear shorter for those patients with a delayed diagnosis. This is known as
lead-time bias."'

Finally, one study suggests there are at least two different populations
of patients with breast cancer, and the effect of delayed diagnosis depends
on which type is present. In one, the tumor grows large within the breast
without either regional or distant metastasis; in the other, distant metastasis
occurs before there is extensive growth within the breast. In this latter
case,
6
delay would have little effect on a patient's chance of survival."
No reported decisions in Missouri directly address loss of a chance.
However, one Missouri appellate decision, Grippe v. Momtazee, has discussed the issue cursorily.1 7 It must be noted that Grippe has no precedental
value because the Missouri Supreme Court vacated the opinion."' Neverthe112. See Parver, supra note 106, at 37; see also Henderson & Canellos, supra
note 101, at 17.
113. Parver, supra note 106, at 37.
114. This clearly occurs in high grade tumors; it is common to find lung cancer
metastatic to the liver long before the primary lung tumor is detectable. See A. MoosA,
M.

ROBSON & S. SCHIMPFF, CoiiPREHENsrvI

TnxTBOOK ON ONCOLOGY ch. 68 (1986).

This theory is consistent only with the doubling time theory because it assumes the

patient ultimately would die regardless of when the disease was diagnosed. If one
adheres to the traditional view of cancer development (and assumes that the primary

tumor can be removed, stopping the cancer from spreading), this theory is more
difficult to justify.
115. Parver, supra note 106, at 52.
116. Henderson & Canellos, supra note 101, at 19.
117. No. 475121, slip op. (Mo. Ct. App. Oct. 2, 1984) (Eastern District decision), vacated, 696 S.W.2d 797 (Mo. 1985) (en banc), on retransfer, 705 S.W.2d
551 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).

118.

696 S.W.2d 797 (Mo. 1985) (en banc). The Eastern District Court of

Appeals decided "the issue of causation in a medical malpractice case involving an
alleged delayed diagnosis." Id. at 798. The Supreme Court ordered transfer from the
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less, Grippe is discussed here since it indicates how Missouri courts may treat
the issue in the future.
Marie Grippe consulted Dr. Sam Momtazee on January 11, 1979, because she found a lump in her breast and her breasts were sore. After the
examination, the doctor wrote "sore breast" in his notes and told her to
return in one year. She did not return until August 21, 1980, by which time
the lump had grown larger. He examined her and told her she had cystic
breasts, but did not recommend mammography or surgical consultation." 9
Mrs. Grippe next saw the doctor on March 19, 1981. The lump was
larger. Dr. Momtazee palpated a 2 cm. x 2 cm. mass, and referred her to a
surgeon immediately.' The surgeon ordered a mammogram, which showed
a 2 cm. x 2 cm. hard cyst. A biopsy disclosed the mass was a poorly differentiated anaplastic tumor. 2 1 A modified mastectomy was performed, which
showed the tumor had metastasized to two axillary lymph nodes in the armpit. After surgery, she was treated by chemotherapy, radiation, and hormone
therapy, but the cancer spread to her lungs and brain. She died on March
11, 1983.12

One of the plaintiff's expert witnesses testified that had the cancer been
localized in the breast, Mrs. Grippe would have had a seventy-five percent
chance of survival for five years. But since it had already spread by the time
of surgery, her chances were only fifty-fifty.1'1
The court reviewed a number of loss of chance cases; it recognized that
some jurisdictions addressing the issue held that evidence of an increased risk
of harm was sufficient to make a submissible case. 4 Following the controlling decisions of the Missouri Supreme Court, however, the court rejected
appellate court to determine the propriety of the lower court's decision and held that
the lower court should have examined alleged trial errors before addressing the causation issue. Id. at 798-99. The cause was retransferred to the court of appeals for a
ruling on the allegations of trial errors. Id. at 799. On retransfer, the appellate court
rejected the allegations of trial error and did not reach the causation issue. 705 S.W.2d
551 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
119. No. 475121, slip op. at 1-2 (Mo. Ct. App. Oct. 2, 1984). On retransfer,
the Eastern District noted that Dr. Momtazee "suggested she consult a surgeon and
recommended the names of two doctors she might see." 705 S.W.2d at 553. The
court did not explain the discrepancy. For purposes of the textual discussion, it will
be assumed that the original opinion was correct. If the second opinion is correct, it
is unnecessary to reach the issue of loss of a chance.
120. No. 475121, slip op. at 2.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 2-3. Although the surgeon estimated her chances decreased from
75-25 to 50-50, no expert posited that the tumor could have been discovered by
mammograph before March 1980.
124. Id. at 5-6.
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a new theory of causation for Missouri medical malpractice cases.' 5
Mr. Grippe was denied recovery for two reasons. First, the evidence
pertaining to the defendant's negligence was "uncertain and, in some instances, contradictory.' 1 26 Also, the plaintiff's experts simply failed to support the contention that the spread of the cancer occurred after Dr. Momtazee
should have detected the tumor. 127
The second reason for the denial of recovery was that the action was
brought under Missouri's wrongful death statute rather than under the survival statute. 1 Since wrongful death is not a common law cause of action,
the statute generally is subject to strict construction; this requires the plaintiff
29
to show the death would not have occurred absent the alleged negligence.1
The plaintiff failed to meet this requirement.
Missouri courts have not yet applied section 323(a) of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts to a medical malpractice case. In fact, research revealed
only four Missouri cases that have cited this section.3 0 In one negligence
action, the court held that the defendant had a duty to exercise care apart
from his actual or constructive knowledge because he rendered services for
the benefit of another under section 323(a). 31 The other three cases also were
unrelated to causation.

32

The Missouri Supreme Court did not address loss of chance under
Grippe33 and, to date, has not addressed it in any other case. The Eastern
125. Id. The Grippe court would have had a difficult time justifying a new
theory of causation when the evidence in that case was so shallow.
126. Id. at 3. No expert testified exactly what effect the delay had on Mrs.
Grippe's ultimate chances of survival.
127. Id.at 4.
128. Id.at 7. The wrongful death statute is Mo. R.v. STAT. § 537.080 (1978).
Mo. Rnv. STAT. § 537.020 (Supp. 1985) is the survival statute.
129. No. 475121, slip op. at 7; cf. O'Grady v. Brown, 654 S.W.2d 904, 908
(Mo. 1983) (en banc) (court said the wrongful death act need not always be construed
strictly). In Herskovits, Judge Pearson recognized that wrongful death statutes normally should be strictly construed; he said, however, that he would interpret the
Washington statute to apply to cases of this type. Herskovits v. Group Health Coop.,
99 Wash. 2d 609, 634-35, 664 P.2d 474, 487 (1983) (Pearson, J., concurring); see
also Roberson v. Counselman, 235 Kan. 1006, 686 P.2d 149 (1984); Daniels v. Hadley
Memorial Hosp., 566 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
130. See Hoover's Dairy v. Mid-American Dairymen, 700 S.W.2d 426 (Mo.
1985); Stanturf v. Sipes, 447 S.W.2d 558 (Mo. 1969); Logsdon v. Duncan, 293 S.W.2d
944 (Mo. 1956); Badami v. Gaertner, 630 S.W.2d 175 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982).
131. Hoover, 700 S.W.2d at 433.
132. Badami dealt with a suit to seek reimbursement from an employer for
injuries covered by workman's compensation, where the employer was found not
negligent. 630 S.W.2d 175. Stanturf,447 S.W.2d 558, and Logsdon, 293 S.W.2d 944
both addressed the issue of negligence, but not the degree of certainty required to
make a submissible jury case.
133. 696 S.W.2d 797 (Mo. 1985).
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District Court of Appeals apparently recognized that victims sometimes are
however,
not compensated for a physician's negligence. It seemed unwilling, 34
to adopt loss of chance even if the facts would permit that result.
In January 1986, the Missouri General Assembly placed a statutory cap
on malpractice liability.' This new law, which contained an emergency provision so it would take effect immediately, limits13 6to $350,000 the amount a
plaintiff will be awarded for pain and suffering.
One could speculate that this new law reflects the public's desire to halt
escalating costs for physicians' services. If the courts follow that sentiment,
perhaps they would be hesitant to adopt a theory that cracks the door for
medical malpractice plaintiffs.
At first glance, loss of a chance appears to solve some problems inherent
in medical malpractice cases. It appears to solve the dilemma of all or nothing
damages awarded under traditional causation theory. Advocates of the theory
say it would benefit both plaintiffs and defendants. Under this approach,
plaintiffs would receive a partial award when previously they could not prove
causation; defendants seldom would pay 100 percent of damages for partial
negligence.' 37
Another argument is that loss of a chance is more consistent with tort
for negligencetheory than traditional causation theories. It allows recovery
38
no matter how small-and this is good social policy.1
Yet despite its seemingly good points, there still are some bugs in the
theory. It could open the door to cases built on shaky grounds, brought by
plaintiffs who simply weren't satisfied with the treatment they received. And,
perhaps even more important, it doesn't leave room for different results that
come from physicians who just happen to make different judgments based
on the facts as they see them.
Perhaps there is a need for revamping the elements of causation in
medical malpractice cases. Missouri courts, however, do not appear ready
to adopt loss of a chance as the answer to any perceived problems.
MARK GRiuM

134. See Grippe, No. 47512, slip op. (Mo. Ct. App. Oct. 10, 1984).
135. Mo. REv. STAT. § 583.210 (Supp. 1987). (The bill enacting this law contained an emergency provision so it would become effective immediately. See S. 663,
83rd Gen. Assem., 2d Sess. (1986)).

136. Id.
137.

at 128.
138.

See King, supra note 27, at 1372; Wolfstone & Wolfstone, supra note 33,
King, supra note 27, at 1375.
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